Yes. This is exactly what we want to achieve. Tail inflation will go down, and it will be demand driven.
This is a good model we can work with.
But I have one question, in an economics sense what would be more valuable, burning tokens, or locking tokens up in productive economics?
like what if the accumulated funds are used to put in Liquid Staking and Lending / Liquidity pools, to continuously boost TVL ?
Just a question. It would be great to argue which brings in more value.
Simple stake is money not moving, money having 0 velocity, creating no economics value.
If simple staking gives out big rewards, it just makes DeFi impossible, in a lot of senses.
All other L1s are pushing tokens to DeFi and DeFi needs capital injection. Doing that in a targeted way is the proposal for growth dividend and it is an alignment between DeFi builders and stakers.
DeFi builders need to make even better products, stakers can enjoy even higher APRs with low risk.
Oh. pulse should have shown you that you have voting power.
It is great that you have come here.
Will try to add the 2nd point especially into curving the inflation. Thanks for the idea.
On idea 1: I think it could be achieved, in a way that unused tokens are burnt. So if there is no adoption, no ramp up, the tokens are burnt. So you get to a lower inflation by that.
Long term holders are receiving the most. Validators are long term holders as well. Builders are creating dApps which bring in growth, if not, they do not receive tokens.
The traditional route, for that you need a big basket of tokens you can use for BD, marketing and sales. And that is centralised.
Great to hear that we’re fully aligned on the inflation trajectory, I think that’s one of the most crucial elements for long-term sustainability. Looking forward to seeing the math behind the adaptive model. It could become a very strong lever to balance growth and value accrual over time.
On the burn vs circular economy point, I understand and appreciate the logic behind stimulating activity through reinvestment, the “AWS credits” analogy is relevant. That said, I believe the most effective approach is likely a dynamic, adaptive mechanism that adjusts the burn/reward ratio based on actual network conditions.
For example, if network activity and burn are already strong, it would make sense to lower the burn percentage and increase builder incentives to stimulate further ecosystem expansion. Conversely, if inflation remains high while network activity and burn are low, the model should be flexible enough to increase the burn share to preserve value and avoid long-term dilution. This adaptive structure would ensure that both growth and value accrual remain balanced across different market cycles.
To make this work in practice, it would be extremely valuable to have a public dashboard or page displaying real-time network data: inflation, burn rate, fee distribution, staking ratio, etc. so that governance decisions can be made transparently and efficiently. Having these key metrics easily accessible would allow the community, builders, and validators to make informed decisions and adjust parameters based on objective data, not just sentiment.
The DAO structure and the upcoming constitution with clear KPIs sound excellent that’s exactly what’s needed to ensure transparency and trust. Once a public draft or framework is available, I’d be very happy to review it and contribute feedback if helpful.
Finally, it’s reassuring to know the roadmap is part of the broader plan. Tying fund deployment to actual traction (liquidity, builders, adoption) is key to making the new economic model work in practice, not just in theory.
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Thanks for all the input. This is great.
In mint&burn models, to simplify things, I see minting as debt and burning as paying down debt.
So in a strict economic sense it brings more value to invest (stake/lending, assuming little to no risk) than to pay down debt.
On the other hand paying down debt brings more trust in the capability of being/becoming sustainable.
I don’t know which is more valuable overall, probably a dynamic mix between them 
Also going from a no debt model (capped supply) to a full speed endless race between growth and debt is an 180° turn which breaks trust and leaves many people behind, so it probably brings (an initial) contraction instead of growth.
- Could you please elaborate how this Reflexive Strategic Investment will suppose to work?
- How you are going to pick your counterparts and due diligence companies?
- Why you are planning to credit a centralized body such as MvX Labs US LLC instead of using a DAO for that prepose, which is exactly how a decentralized chain should function? What guardrail mechanisms you are going to implement, so to ensure proper money management?
- What will happen with the minted funds if the price goes lower than the respective threshold? Are they going to be burned? What happens in a situation when the newly minted funds are already used as a leverage for ETF, DAT etc.?
- How you are going to protect the long term EGLD investors form severe dilution, who already paid harshly for the MvX achievements so far?
Thank you!
Why is the Reflexive Strategic Investment connected with the new tokenomics? How is this related since RSI will be an event that is not established in the chain as a smart contract step, but as an action made on top of the new tokenomics?
What will happen with the minted egld (that goes to this entities that are not related with the onchain activity) after those locked 3 years?
Updated the docs. Hopefully it responds to all your questions.
I would really appreciate a response to my questions since I read all the posts and no one has raised this question? Thank you!
In my opinion in the final document should be added a stipulation that the newly minted tokens won’t be used for bailing out MvX Labs LLC or other team controlled body, or any other company in case it is short of cash or insolvent. Please, ensure that this will be added to the document.
Seeking clarification on the RSI which I have not fully heard yet. In interviews it has been described as a financial vehicle like Microstrategy behaves to buy back Bitcoin and continue the flywheel. They raise capital by selling Microstrategy shares when the premium allows to buy bitcoin. There is no option to mint new bitcoin for this
In our case, will the egld mints for capital raises for the DAT, ETF and MvX Labs US LLC, at price points act as just an ‘ignition’ to raise the amount needed to trigger the process or will continuous mints of egld occur whenever capital raises are wanted to buyback again or invest somewhere? …. OR will a new company to be listed on NYSE have its shares sold to raise capital rather than continuous egld mints?
So to articulate which scenario will it be >
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Capital raises for investments and buybacks will always come from fresh locked egld mints
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Initial raises come from the 3 price point mint triggers noted in the RSI table and from then on raises will come from sales of shares from a new Company which will be formed and listed on the NYSE meaning no more egld mints beyond what is stated in the document table above
Thankyou
As this economic model aims revenue growth we definitely need as KPI something similar to EPS (Earnings Per Share) or Earnings Per Token. Only circulating tokens should be taken in measuring this KPI.
Regarding the question of Robert - locked tokens may generate growth, but there is also a great risk. Since this tokens will be used as collateral, in unfavored situations like startup insolvency the tokens may have to be sold in the open market for covering the loses. This may generate unprecedented selling pressure, which could lead to negative effects for the entire chain.
Problem
The current proposal lack contract-level anti-abuse measures.
They are needed to stop exploitation of the 90% fee allocation.
TL;DR explanation
Not all TXs are good. If not guard railed, the SC generated fees can and will be exploited by malicious builders.
A builder can spam the network with thousands of contracts, from thousands of wallets, hype worthless interactions, get users to pay fees, collect 90%, then dump that EGLD. That’s a transfer from users to the builder, plus sell pressure from the builder’s conversions. Quality filters and throttles are needed so fees reward useful activity, not spam.
Quick solution
- Keep the 90/10 target, but gate it behind probation, caps, audits, locks, and auto-staking.
- Publish the abuse rules and thresholds in plain English in the economic addendum.
- Show all builder payouts and quality metrics on the explorer, with links to raw data.
This keeps the “builders get paid for real use” vision, blocks fee farming, and cuts sell pressure without sacrificing openness or developer friendliness.
Possible implementation ideas; non exclusive
- Probation + escrow for new contracts
- First N days/blocks after deployment: builder fee-share is locked.
- Unblock linearly over X weeks IF no red flags (rug reports, blocklist, abnormal patterns).
- If flagged by governance, slash part of the fees (see #8).
- Per-contract & per-developer daily caps
- Put a hard, programatic daily cap on fee-share a contract (and a developer identity) can collect.
- Overflow auto-burns or routes to treasury. Caps reset daily.
- Caps can scale with unique users, etc to avoid penalizing real growth.
- Identity-level aggregation (“same dev, many contracts”)
- To stop “thousands of tiny contracts”, require a free, on-chain developer registration (KYD - know your developer) to receive fee-share.
- Aggregate caps across all contracts registered by the same dev address (or multisig/team).
- Sybil-aware fee-share
- Discount interactions that look like self-funded loops (e.g., the contract deployer or its funding cluster paying most fees).
- A simple rule: no fee-share for calls funded by addresses that the contract/deployer funded in the last K blocks. (Not perfect, but raises attack cost.)
- Tiered fee-share by trust level
- Lower default rate (builder/burn) for brand-new, unaudited contracts.
- Upgraded to higher rate after: audit posted, minimum unique users, or 30 days of clean history.
- Downgrade back lower rates on abuse signals.
- Auto-stake a slice of builder rewards
- Route x% of the builder’s share to auto-staked, time-locked EGLD (e.g., 30–90 days).
- Builders still get yield, but immediate sell pressure drops and incentives align long-term.
- Dynamic base-fee + congestion throttle
- Keep the base-fee mechanism that rises with load. “1000s SC” Spammers face growing costs.
- Add a per-block gas limit per contract (soft throttle) that relaxes as contract reputation improves.
- Builder bond + slashing for fraud
- To receive fee-share, post a small bond (e.g., equivalent of a few days of expected fees).
- If the project rugs (community vote with evidence), slash bond to user protection fund and suspend payout.
- Quality metrics on the public dashboard (so abuse is obvious)
- Builder payouts vs unique users, 7/30-day retention, median fees per user, share of fees from top 10 payers.
- Sudden spikes with low retention or payer concentration light up yellow/red.
- Wallet warnings for unaudited contracts
- In the official wallet/explorer, show a clear warning (and link to audit/code) before users sign any fee-heavy calls to risky contracts.
These will not kill legit builders
Good apps clear these thresholds naturally. Caps can scale with unique users, vesting is short, and auto-stake still pays yield. The only strategies that break are wash-usage and short-term fee extraction.
For those RSIs to happen, the network has to show growth first. DAT/ETF/VC deals will not happen if they do not see green candles for a period of time. Those people enter when there is upside in the market and in the ecosystem.
RSIs cannot be verified onchain. But before minting happens, it is stated that all contracts need to be public and to be shown to the community clearly, 2 weeks before.
After 3 years, the DAT and ETF should own a couple of times more eGLD than they started with and it will be in the contracts what they can do with the unlocked tokens, same for the VCs.
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Ok. That can be added, however, it is already written in the docs that the tokens are minted only if DAT/ETF/Funding round happens. Otherwise those do not happen.
They will act as an ignition to trigger the process. Continuous mints will not happen.
Yes, DAT will have its own shares, and raises capital on those and buys more eGLD from the open market.
So in short it will be 2. From your scenarios. But the 3 price points are not the only trigger, there are one trigger, the other has to be the full public document of DAT/ETC/Funding happening.
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Most of the interactions with the chain come from xPortal.
the dApps there go through a verification before being accepted.
everything on the chain remain permissionless and dApps can be accessed out of xPortal as well.
We had 30% royalties and did not see these kind of attacks.
Users will not use stupid dApps, like they will not pay for transactions even if those are sub cent to do useless things.
I think this can work in the open, and if we/community sees something wrong, than these kind of guardrail can be added. One even simple guardrail would be to use these funds only for relayed transactions, so as gas spent in the network.