Governance formula problem

I understand your idea but I think it can be improved

What I am about to present, I do not like, but it seems to be needed to get the voting % higher:

When delegating EGLD; you also delegate voting power and the staking provider can vote for you.
HOWEVER the user can vote with his own voting power also.
If he happens to do this, he overrides the decision from the staking provider basically.

That’s my idea.

So staking provider votes with all EGLD, but user can override, by just voting himself.

Also, we cannot force users to vote, but we can force staking providers to vote (more easily).
We cannot hinder users from using the chain “because you didn’t vote” or anything like that.

But we COULD propose a punishment if the staking provider does not vote, because it’s his job to do it, in this scenario where he is repsonsible for the voting power.
Get me?

A punishment of EGLD jailed nodes or a punishment in terms of loss of node-score could be a good idea.

But then again, not sure if this negative-incentive is even needed, I suppose most staking providers would vote.

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